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Nuclear power currently supplies over 15% of the world's electricity.' The
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA or Agency) predicts that by 1990
more than 500 nuclear power plants, operating in 35 countries, will generate 20%
of all electricity.2 Nuclear power is primarily regulated by national agencies; 3
each country sets its own safety and technical standards and each must undertake
the research and development necessary to insure a safe nuclear program. The
*Member of the class of 1988, University of Michigan Law School.
1. IAEA Press Release, PR187/4 (January 27, 1987).
2. Blix, The Post-Chernobyl Outlook For Nuclear Power, 28:3 IAEA BULL. II (Autumn, 1986).
397 nuclear power plants were operating in 26 countries and an estimated 133 were under construction
by the end of 1986. 29:2 IAEA BULL. 65 (1987).
3. Individual countries are legally responsible for their nuclear power programs. U.S. GEN.
AccrG. OFF., INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR SAFETY CONCERNS (GAO/
NSIAD-85--128) at 4 (Sept. 30, 1985) [hereinafter cited as GAO, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE]. See
generally Rosen, Establishment of an International Nuclear Safety Body, 25:3 IAEA BULL. (Sept.,
1983).
James K. Asselstine, Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Agency, explained the significance
of ineffective national regulation in testimony before the House Subcommittee on Energy Conserva-
tion and Power:
The bottom line is that, given the present level of safety being achieved by the operating
nuclear powerplants in this country, we can expect to see a core meltdown accident within the
next 20 years, and it is possible that such an accident could result in offsite releases of
radiation which are as large as, or larger than, the releases estimated to have occured at
Chernobyl.
NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY, HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY CONSERVATION AND
POWER OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (May 22 &
July 16, 1986) Ihereinafter cited as NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY HEARINGS]. "[T]he Commission
acknowledged that the risk of a core meltdown in the next 20 years at a U.S. plant was between 12 and
45 percent, although, allowing for significant uncertainties, the true figure could be higher." Id. at 115
(statement of Rep. Markey, Subcomm. chairman).
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lack of international regulation of nuclear energy results in a fragmented system
which is duplicative and dangerous, as countries with less effective research and
development produce less reliable nuclear power plants; 4 furthermore, this na-
tionalistic approach to nuclear safety ignores the transboundary effects of radia-
tion.5 The magnitude of the risks of nuclear power necessitates reliable
international safety regulation.
Nuclear power plant accidents, such as at Three Mile Island (TMI)6 and its
4.
National approaches to nuclear safety developed over the years have resulted not only in
differences in regulations, but also in variations in technical requirements from one country to
another. This has been a burden for the international nuclear market, and it has possibly had
an effect on the level of public confidence.
Rosen, supra note 3, at 3.
5. In countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, for example,
every fourth reactor is within 40 kilometers of an international border. Panel, I CURRENT NUCLEAR
POWER PLANT SAFETY ISSUES 474 (1981).
6. Prior to Chernobyl, the most serious nuclear accident occurred at Unit 2 of the Three Mile Island
Nuclear Power Station on March 28, 1979.
The accident at Three Mile Island began with a combination of malfunctions that led to the
stoppage of the flow of feedwater to the reactor's steam generators. As the primary system's pressure
rose, a relief valve, which had opened to reduce the pressure, stuck open undetected for approx-
imately 150 minutes. The resulting loss of coolant and decrease in pressure caused a buildup of steam
in the reactor vessel allowing the core temperature to rise and the fuel cladding to fail. Ireland, Scott
& Stratton, Three Mile Island and Multiple Failure Accidents, 2:2 Los ALAMOS SCIENCE 74, 75
(Summer/Fall, 1981).
Several other incidents have mirrored the beginning stages of the accident at TMI. On June 9, 1986
a pressurized-water reactor at Davis-Besse in Ohio had an accident which "mimicked closely the first
few minutes of the disaster at its sister plant [TMI] in 1979." The reactor was without feedwater to
remove heat for 12 minutes. When deprived of coolant, a reactor's core can melt as at TMI. The
incident was a repeat performance for Davis-Besse; between 1977 and 1979, 20 incidents at the plant
involved the partial or complete loss of feedwater. The loss of feedwater, one of the principal
characteristics of the TMI accident, was not the only parallel between the June 9 accident and TMI. A
relief valve stuck at Davis-Besse for about a minute before operators noticed the resultant drop in
pressure and took emergency measures. Nuclear Accident Mimics Three Mile Island, NEW SCIENTIST
21 (July 11, 1985).
An incident at England's Heysham I nuclear power station resembled TMI in other ways. Although
fuel had not yet been loaded into the reactor, the incident revealed serious safety problems at the
plant. "The post mortem on that accident [TMI] ... laid most of the blame for the ensuing chaos on
bad layout in the control room, confusing alarm systems and poorly trained operators. Embarassingly
for the board [Central Electricity Generating Board], most of these elements were present in the
Heysham incident." Milne, Mistakes That Mirrored Three Mile Island, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 1985.
"The equipment operated better than the people. If they'd left the plant [TMI] alone, it appears
that the accident probably never would have happened .. " R. Bacher, quoted in Comments on
Reactor Safety From Leaders of the Manhattan Project, Los ALAMOS SCIENCE at 2.
The accident at Chernobyl, too, was caused largely by inept and poorly trained operators, see infra
note 9. Overworked operators may also pose a serious safety risk. Recently, one United States power
plant operator was found to have worked 97 hours in a seven day period. Wald, Weaknesses in
Nuclear Regulatory Program Cited, N.Y. Times, July 17, 1986, at B5, col. I.
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many precursors,7 were relatively ineffective at bringing attention to the true
dangers of nuclear energy and at spurring world-wide demand for improved
power plant safety. Although TMI was analyzed by special sessions of the IAEA s
and some safety improvements were made, the international nuclear community
soon regained its confidence.
The April 26, 1986 accident at Chernobyl9 resurrected the demand for im-
7. For example, in 1957, radioactive fission products were released in a major accident at the
Windscale plant in Liverpool, England; in 1961 an explosion occurred in a reactor at Idaho Falls in the
United States, and in 1966 a partial core meltdown occurred at the Enrico Fermi reactor in Detroit,
Michigan. Petrosyants, The Soviet Union and the Development of Nuclear Power, 28:3 IAEA BULL. 7
(Autumn, 1986). A. Petrosyants, Chairman of the Soviet State Committee on the Utilization of
Atomic Energy, reports that between 1971 and 1985, 151 incidents occurred in the nuclear power
plants of 14 countries, other than the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Id. A recently declassified GAO study,
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR SAFETY CONCERNS, mentions the 151
incident figure, although the publicized version does not contain details. See GAO, INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSE, supra note 3, at 10. See also NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY HEARINGS, supra note 3, at 3;
Franklin, Report Finds Potential Problems With Atom Plants in 14 Nations, N.Y.Times, May 1, 1986,
at A14, col. 5.
8. TMI spawned a series of IAEA emergency meetings. The areas of occupational safety and
human fallibility received intensive study. Post-accident study of TMI revealed the need for a man-
machine interface and for emergency preparedness. Rosen, Recent Nuclear Safety Activities at the
IAEA, 24:1 IAEA BULL. 8 (March, 1982).
9. Since the April 26, 1986 accident, the sequence of events leading to the accident at Chernobyl 4
has been largely reconstructed. The basic cause of the accident was that, in their determination to
conduct an unauthorized experiment, operators violated operating rules and overrode protection
systems. For a technical breakdown of the events culminating in the accident see Accident Event
Sequence, NUCLEAR ENGINEERING INT'L, Oct. 1986, at 4.
Soviet engineers have, since the accident, admitted to reactor design defects and to problems with
systems analysis and operator training. Wilkie, Soviet Engineers Admit Failings in Reactor Designs,
NEW SCIENTIST, Aug. 28, 1986, at 14. The Soviet Union, however, still plans to expand its reliance
on nuclear power from 11% to 50% of all electricity needs. Broad, Rise in Retarded Children
Predicted from Chernobyl, N.Y.Times, Feb. 16, 1987, at A9, col 1.
Chernobyl caused the evacuation of 135,000 people from a 30 kilometer exclusion zone around the
plant and, based on figures from a Soviet report, may cause up to 24,000 deaths in the European part
of the Soviet Union. This figure does not estimate deaths beyond Soviet borders. Counting the Human
Costs, NUCLEAR ENGINEERING INT'L, Oct. 1986, at 8. Hans Blix, Director General of the IAEA,
reported on January 19, 1987 that people may now resettle up to within 10 kilometers of the plant.
USSR-IAEA Co-operation Reinforced, 29:1 IAEA BULL. 51 (1987).
Total estimated damages from Chernobyl are impossible to compute, however, US Secretary of
Energy John Herrington has stated that the accident has cost countries hundreds of millions of dollars.
IAEA Adopts Safety Conventions, NUCLEAR ENGINEERING INT'L, Nov. 1986, at 4. Another estimate
claims that Chernobyl cost the Soviet Union more than $3 billion. Hudson and Roth, Lingering
Fallout, A Year Later, Mishap at Chernobyl Damps Atom-Power Industry, Wall St. J., April 23, 1987,
at 1, col. 1.
The accident at Chernobyl has raised several key safety isues. Operator training and reactor design
are among the most critical. American power plant operators contend that a Chemobyl-type accident
is not possible in the United States because U.S. commercial reactors have outer containment and are
not moderated by graphite. See, e.g., May, Disaster in Soviet Affects Shoreham, N.Y.Times, May I,
1986, at A14, col. 1; Boffey, Soviet, Reporting Atom Plant "Disaster," Seeks Help Abroad to Fight
Reactor Fire: Assessment of U.S., N.Y.Times, April 30, 1986, at Al, col. 3.
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proved safety at nuclear power plants. Chernobyl focused debate on interna-
tionally mandated safety standards, the proper role of the IAEA, emergency
response systems, and liability standards for nuclear accidents. Most important,
Chernobyl changed the political climate of the nuclear states. Countries, suffi-
ciently alarmed by the realities of nuclear disasters that Chernobyl so dramat-
ically illustrated, are now less resistant to cooperating in nuclear matters and are
more receptive to reworking and improving international nuclear law.
The process of reform began after Chernobyl. Following an overture by
Mikhail Gorbachev, the International Atomic Energy Agency approved two con-
ventions on nuclear safety. These beginnings, however, are insufficient. More
widespread change is required, and, given the post-Chernobyl political climate,
possible. Nuclear safety demands the obligatory reporting of all commercial
nuclear incidents and the establishment of mandatory base-level safety standards.
The first section of this note focuses on the IAEA's role in the existing network
of international organizations designed to improve nuclear power plant safety.
The second section examines the implications of the Chernobyl accident for
international cooperation in the nuclear field. The final section proposes several
improvements for nuclear safety management, and is subdivided accordingly.
The first subsection analyzes the incident reporting systems of the IAEA and the
Nuclear Energy Agency and recommends amending the IAEA Convention on
Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident to ensure that all nuclear incidents, as
well as accidents, are covered by its terms. The second subsection proposes the
standardization of safety requirements for nuclear power plants.
I. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL REGULATION
The long-recognized need for international cooperation in the nuclear field has
led to various bilateral' ° and multilateral agreements and to the creation of several
international agencies." The United Nation's International Atomic Energy
Documents obtained by the subcommittee show that the Administration had a knee-jerk
reaction to the Soviet meltdown. Internal briefing memoranda reveal their primary concern
was not to investigate the possibility of such an accident occurring in a U.S. nuclear plant, but
rather to make blanket statements as to why they believed a serious accident could not happen
in this country.
NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY HEARINGS, supra note 3, at 3. But see infra note 26.
10. The United States had established, as of June 1984, 21 bilateral safety arrangements. See GAO,
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 3, at 19.
11. Many countries now conduct joint research on nuclear power and share individual develop-
ments with other nations. The first joint nuclear project was the Dutch-Norwegian reactor, completed
in 1951, at Kjeller Center. Other international agreements include the Nuclear Energy Agency,
EURATOM, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. B. GOLDSCHMIDT, International Cooper-
ation in the Nuclear Field, in NUCLEAR ENERGY :A SENSIBLE ALTERNATIVE 181 (K. Ott and B.
Spinrad ed. 1985).
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Agency is, with 113 member states, 2 the largest and most influential such
agency.
The IAEA came into legal existence on July 29, 1957, with the main purposes
of furthering peaceful uses of nuclear energy 13 and limiting the proliferation of
nuclear weapons.' 4 The Agency facilitates the international exchange of informa-
tion on nuclear matters, develops internationally recommended safety standards,
and fosters training of nuclear personnel. The Agency summarizes its objectives
in improving safety as: "(a) The establishment of a coherent and comprehensive
set of Safety Codes and Guides based on international consensus; (b) Missions
and expert assignments; (c) The dissemination of technical information; (d)
Training in the field of nuclear safety and regulation; and (e) Nuclear emergency
assistance. "1 s
Although the IAEA has issued a myriad of safety standards and guides, it lacks
the power to insure their adoption. Only when a member state requests technical
assistance can the Agency insist that some, but not all, of its recommended
standards be implemented. 6
Perhaps the most important safety information compiled by the IAEA is con-
12. IAEA Information Circular, INFCIRC/2/Rev. 36, Sept. 1986.
13. D. Caulfield, THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE
UNITED NATIONS 2 (1959), inaug. diss. Cologne.
14. The safeguard system of the IAEA is one of the Agency's principal functions, one without
which the Agency might not have been formed.
As used in the Statute and as restricted by established practice to the external controls
implemented by the Agency, the term "safeguards" means the measures taken by the Agency
to prevent: (A) Additional States from achieving a military nuclear capability ("prolifera-
tion") by the misuse of assistance rendered to them by the Agency for peaceful purposes; (B)
Proliferation by the misuse of certain other international transfers; (C) The increase in the
nuclear military resources of any State (i.e., whether or not a nuclear power) through the use
of nuclear materials produced under Agency safeguards; (D) The use for military purposes of
nuclear items submitted to Agency control, which might otherwise either lead to proliferation
or to the increase in the nuclear military resources of any State.
P. SzAsz, THE LAW AND PRACTICES OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 533, (Int'l
Atomic Energy Agency Legal Series No. 7, 1970). For a more detailed analysis of the safeguard
functions of the IAEA see generally Id. at chapter 21.
15. IAEA SERVICES AND ASSISTANCE IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY, 1983, at 2.
16. Article Ill, section 6 of the IAEA Statute provides that the Agency shall set standards for its
own practices and "provide for the application of these standards to ... operations making use of
materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency .. "
Aside from safeguards, the only regulations explicilty mentioned in the Statute are the
"standards for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property . . ."
referred to in Article II.A.6. However, these can be made binding on Member States only
through Project Agreements (Article XI.F.4(b) and XII.A.2), or on the basis of requests, by
the States concerned. . ..
SzAsz, supra note 14, at 330.
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tained in the Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) documents. 7 Instituted in 1974,
the Agency's NUSS program establishes codes of practice for the regulation,
siting, design, safety, and quality assurance of nuclear power plants. NUSS
documents represent the "technical consensus among the developers, experts,
and users of nuclear power - a common understanding for safety."18 How-
ever, many experts are unaware of the NUSS documents. 9 The NUSS standards
are, therefore, insufficient.2 0
Although no plans were initially made to formalize the NUSS documents
through a convention mandating their use, suggestions for mandatory safety
standards have been made in recent years.2 ' Currently NUSS documents are mere
suggestions to states already involved with or contemplating the construction or
operation of nuclear power plants. Although the Agency attempts to increase
NUSS acceptance through missions of experts,22 its teams are somewhat mis-
directed, for a state must request Agency assistance before a team will be sent,
and members seeking Agency help are those most likely to follow IAEA recom-
mendations without Agency experts.23 Thus, states with established nuclear pro-
17. In addition to the IAEA's NUSS program, the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO), through its Technical Committee 85 "Nuclear Energy" program, strives for world-wide
standardization in the nuclear field. Becker, ISO: International Standards Development br Nuclear
Technology, 11 CURRENT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY ISSUES 266 (1981). The ISO, formed in
1946, is comprised of the partly governmental, partly non-governmental national standards agencies
of 86 countries. Id. at 261. Unlike the IAEA's NUSS standards, which primarily address regulatory
bodies, ISO concentrates on technical standards for industrial and contractual purposes, as well as
standardized procedures, designs, materials, test methods, and terminology. Id. at 272. The ISO and
the IAEA cooperate to avoid duplicative and inconsistent results. Id. at 273.
18. Rosen, supra note 8, at 8.
19. Andreas, staff member, Nuclear Safety Section of the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Safety,
Practical Experience in Nuclear Safety, IAEA BULL. SUPPLEMENT, 1982, at 17.
20. While the IAEA strives to disseminate NUSS standards and other technological information
widely, there is an overwhelming amount of data available. A more thorough discussion and publica-
tion of such recommendations might result in more receptive attitudes toward them. Public opinion
within states could be useful in achieving the adoption of NUSS standards.
21. The Soviet Union has encouraged the use of international standards. Soviets Propose New
Regime, NUCLEAR ENGINEERING INT'L, Nov. 1986, at 5. H. Blix briefly discusses the possibility of
internationally binding minimum safety regulations in Blix, supra note 2, at II. An IAEA working
group was organized to meet in November, 1986 to discuss the implications of mandatory safety
regulations. Rosen, New Directions in Nuclear Safety, 28:3 IAEA BULL. 14 (Autumn, 1986).
22. The IAEA sends out such teams, called Operational Safety Review Teams, or OSART, at the
request of Member States. Governments may wish to have such international verification of the safety
of nuclear power plants on their territories, in order to satisfy both internal opinion and neighboring
countries." Blix, supra note 2, at 11-12.
OSART teams, composed of 10- 15 experts, travel to a plant site for a two to three week review of
the plant. The goal of an OSART mission is to compare the plant's safety practices with interna-
tionally successful practices and to exchange ideas. Rosen, supra note 21, at 13.
23. Most states requesting IAEA assistance are lesser developed countries. Milne, The Show Goes
On, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 4, 1986, at 19. The IAEA has sent review teams to only nine countries,
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grams are likely to continue without input from Agency teams, even though they
may not be operating safe reactors,24 while countries developing nuclear power
will be inundated with Agency information.
The IAEA is not limited to developing safety standards; the Agency provides
numerous other valuable services for the international nuclear community. The
Agency conducts research on safety and waste disposal techniques, pools infor-
mation, eases the transfer of technology, and provides a forum for international
communication on nuclear issues.
The IAEA has recently expanded its role in maintaining and improving the
safety of nuclear power plants world-wide.2 5 However, the current network of
international regulation is inadequate as only a limited number of countries
comply with IAEA standards.
II. CHERNOBYL AND ITS EFFECTS
The Chernobyl accident demonstrated the immediate need for safety improve-
ments at nuclear power plants, and corrective efforts have been made at both
national2 6 and international levels. Internationally, the political climate remains
mostly in the Third World. Such countries, in the process of establishing nuclear power programs,
seem more likely to adopt IAEA safety standards in an attempt to legitimize their programs.
Developing countries, according to IAEA officials, lack the trained personnel to draft individual
nuclear safety regulations and to implement such standards. See GAO, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE,
supra note 3, at 4.
In 1984, 10 of the 25 countries operating nuclear power plants were developing countries. Mexico,
Cuba, Rumania, Poland, and the Phillipines are now constructing nuclear reactors for the first time.
According to IAEA projections, by the year 2000, just over one half of the countries with nuclear
power plants will be developing countries. Id. at 2.
24.
Western experts on nuclear technology asserted . . . that the Soviet Union had the worst
safety planning of any nation, even worse than that in developing countries and the rest of the
Soviet bloc .... In order of safety, one would put the Germans first, the Americans in the
middle and the Russians at the bottom."
Diamond, Western Experts Say Soviet Has Worst Nuclear Safety, N.Y.Times, May I, 1986, at A
12, col. 1.
25. The IAEA provides technical information to member states through meetings and publications,
advisory services, the Technical Co-operation Programme for lesser developed countries, and the
development of internationally recommended safety standards. Rosen, supra note 8, at 8-9.
26. In the United States, for example, the closing of the Hanford Nuclear Facility in Washington
state was a response to the Chernobyl accident. The accident at Chernobyl cast doubt on the reliability
and safety of graphite-moderated reactors. Two reactors in the United States, the Fort St. Vrain
reactor and the Hanford N reactor are graphite-moderated. Chernobyl Casts a Shadow, NUCLEAR
ENGINEERING INT'L., June 1986, at 2. The Hanford N reactor has been shut down, and $50 million of
repair work was begun in January, 1987. Plutonium Plant is Restarted, N.Y.Times, Feb. 24, 1987, at
A20, col. I. For a comparison between the Hanford N Reactor and the Chernobyl reactor see
NUCLEAR SAFETY: COMPARISON OF DOE's HANFORD N-REACTOR WITH THE CHERNOBYL REAC-
TOR, GAO/RCED-86-213BR (Aug. 1986). Chernobyl also demonstrated the dangers of plants
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good for revising nuclear law. A now disconcerted public has increased its
pressure on officials, 7 and governments themselves seem much more willing to
cooperate with each other.
The IAEA held a series of emergency meetings after Chernobyl and drafted
the two conventions that it presented to the Agency's Board of Governors on
September 24, 1986.218 The Agency adopted both the Convention on Early Notifi-
cation of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a
Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency and, as of November, 1986, 57
countries had signed both documents. Both Conventions enter into force 30 days
after three states have consented to be bound by them. 29 Norway, Czechoslo-
vakia, and Denmark signed the early notification convention with binding effect
on October 27, 1986.30 The Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear
Accident or Radiological Emergency entered into force on February 26, 1987. 3 1
without containment structures. Five United States plutonium producing facilities operate without
outer containment: four at the Savannah River Plant near Aiken, South Carolina, and one at the
Hanford Reservation in Washington. NUCLEAR ENERGY, A COMPENDIUM OF RELEVANT GAO PROD-
UCTS ON REGULATION, HEALTH, AND SAFETY, I GAO/RCED-86-132 (June, 1986). Similarly, early
British Magnox reactors do not have containment structures. NUCLEAR ENGINEERING INT'L, Id. at 2.
Chernobyl brought out the inadequacies of the present system of measuring radiation releases
worldwide. "From the outset of the Cherobyl accident, this became a major problem - initially
because of the failure of the Soviet Union to provide notification of the location, time, or magnitude
of the accident, and later because of the extensive data retrieval effort required to acquire all the
essential data, for a four-to seven-day prior period, encompassing the western Soviet Union, Europe,
and eventually the entire northern hemisphere." M. Dickerson, ARAC Response to the Chernobyl
Reactor Accident, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, UCID-20834, at 3 (July, 1986).
The IAEA has initiated a new program to provide comparison data for use in the event of
radiological releases and to help member states set up monitoring laboratories. New IAEA Programme
for Radioactivity Measurements, 29:1 IAEA BULL. 52 (1987).
27. A 1987 study by Worldwatch Institute, Reassessing Nuclear Power: The Fallout From Cher-
nobyl, found that "the political consequences of the accident last April at the Soviet Union's Cher-
nobyl reactor was [sic] the 'collapse in country after country' of a 'pro-nuclear consensus' and the
growth of anxiety about nuclear safety to levels that government leaders could not ignore. 'Chernobyl
was an event of major historical proportions that later generations will undoubtedly mark as a
milestone of the 20th century. Its real importance lies not in the actual accident but in the fact that it
has triggered international political recognition of the economic and human tragedy that nuclear
power threatens to become. "' Franklin, Report Calls Mistrust a Threat to Atom Power, in N.Y.Times,
March 8, 1987, at A27, col. 1. See also Molotsky, Phase-Out of A-Plants in U.S. is Urged,
N.Y.Times, April 30, 1986, at A12, col 4.
28. Conventions on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and on Assistance in the Case of a
Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, March 23, 1987, Item 996-A, 996-B, Treaty Doc.
100-4. 41.V4:100-4.
29. Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Art.
14, par. 4; Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Art. 12, par. 3. 30. IAEA Adopts
Safety Conventions, supra note 9, at 3.
30. IAEA Adopts Safety Conventions, supra note 9, at 3.
31. IAEA Press Release, PR/87/5, January 27, 1987.
Although both Conventions are now in effect, many states who have consented to be bound by the
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The speed with which the IAEA's conventions were ratified is indicative of the
post-Chernobyl political atmosphere. The USSR, although initially slow to re-
lease information concerning Chernobyl, has made significant contributions to
reducing international tension over nuclear matters. The USSR has allowed
IAEA inspection of the disabled plant,32 produced a report on the accident for
discussion at Agency meetings,33 released information on cleanup measures,
34
and planned a study of the long-term effects of radiation on those within the 30-
kilometer evacuation zone around the Chernobyl plant. 35
After the Chernobyl accident, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev wrote Hans
Blix, Director General of the IAEA, stressing the need for international coopera-
tion and action on nuclear safety matters. "Ensuring reliable and safe nuclear
power development must become a universal international obligation of all States
severally and collectively." 36 Many of Mr. Gorbachev's suggestions are found in
the two conventions; 37 others, however, deserve further attention. "It will be
necessary . . to go further - to elaborate within the IAEA recommendations
on nuclear power plant safety questions and to strengthen national and, where
appropriate, international verification of compliance with them in all States."
3
1
Mr. Gorbachev's letter is indicative of the shift in the Soviet stance since
Chernobyl. The Chernobyl accident has focused international attention on nu-
clear power safety issues, and many countries, including the USSR, are demon-
Conventions have made reservations as to the dispute settlement procedures and thus are not bound by
these provisions. See Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Art. 11, par. 2, and
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Art. 13, par.
2. IAEA Information Circular, INFCIRC/335/Add. 1; INFCIRC/336/Add.2 (May, 1987).
32. D. MARPLES, CHERNOBYL & NUCLEAR POWER IN THE USSR, 26 (1986); Chernobyl-The
IAEA Visit, NUCLEAR ENGINEERING INT'L, June 1986, at 3.
33. Good Work by the IAEA, NUCLEAR ENGINEERING INT'L, Oct. 1986, at 9.
34. The Show Goes On, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 4, 1986, at 19.
35. N. HAWKES, G. LEAN, D. LEIGH, R. McKIE, D. PRINGLE & A. WILSON, CHERNOBYL: THE
END OF A NUCLEAR DREAM 211 (1986); Hoffer, Moscow Plans Huge Chernobyl Study, Wash. Post,
May 23, 1987, at A28, col. 1.
The Soviet Union's failure to notify the IAEA of the Chernobyl accident was arguably not contrary
to then existing international law. See Chernobyl - The U.S. Reaction, NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
INT'L, June 1986, at 4. But consider Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment, which provides: "States are responsible for ensuring that activities within their jurisdic-
tion or control cause no damage to the environment of another state." Hoess, Schmidt & Binner,
Transfrontier Aspects of the Use of Nuclear Power, CURRENT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY
ISSUES, supra note 17, at 197.
The Soviets' quick notification of the accident aboard its nuclear submarine on October 3, 1986 was
clearly within the spirit of the IAEA Convention on Early Notification. IAEA Adopts Safety Conven-
tions, supra note 9, at 4. Gwertzman, Moscow Reports Fire on Atomic Sub in North Atlantic,
N.Y.Times, Oct. 5, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
36. IAEA INFORMATION CIRCULAR, June 20, 1986, at 1, INFCIRC/334, attachment.
37. Mr. Gorbachev, for example, suggests an international mechanism for the provision of mutual
assistance and notification in the case of nuclear emergencies.
38. IAEA INFORMATION CIRCULAR, supra note 36, at 2.
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strating their willingness to pursue more comprehensive solutions to these
problems.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The IAEA conventions and Mr. Gorbachev's letter signal the beginning of a
reform movement for nuclear power plant safety. Alone, however, these improve-
ments are insufficient. More comprehensive change is necessary to ensure the
safe use of nuclear power.
A. Incident Reporting
Improved nuclear safety requires a reporting system for all nuclear incidents. 39
The accident at Three Mile Island made this need apparent. Although two similar
accidents preceded TMI, one in Switzerland in 197440 and another in Ohio in
1977,41 their analyses were unavailable to assist the operators of TMI. 42 One
commentator explains the importance of this omission:
As the investigation into the accident at Three Mile Island made clear, there is a
wealth of safety-related information buried in the operating history of the world's
nuclear power plants. Unusual events, when analysed within the context of the
environment of a specific plant, can highlight general weaknesses in design, con-
struction, and operation. 43
By the end of 1986, nuclear power plant operators had accumulated over 4,200
years of reactor experience. 44 The information available through analyses of
incidents at nuclear plants, many of which are over 15 years old and some of
which have been in operation for 25 years, is crucial to accident prevention and
effective reactor design. 45
Two agencies now operate incident reporting systems. The IAEA's Incident
Reporting System (IAEA-IRS) aims at "harmoniz[ing] with national systems, to
collect, review, store, and disseminate information on a world-wide basis.-46 The
IAEA-IRS was developed in 1982 and began operating on a trial basis in 1983.41
39. Tolstykh, IAEA-IRS: New Directions in a Cooperative Network for Nuclear Safety, in 28:4
IAEA BULL. 8 (Winter, 1986).
40. GAO, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 3, at 22.
41. See supra note 6.
42. See GAO, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 3, at 22. See Supra note 6.
43. Epel, Franzen & Osmachkin, IAEA Efforts to Improve Nuclear Power Plant Operational
Safety, in 25:3 IAEA BULL 9 (Sept., 1983).
44. 29:2 IAEA BULL. 65 (1987).
45. IAEA Press Release, PR/85/8, June 18, 1985. GAO, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note
3, at 22. See supra note 6.
46. Epel, Franzel & Osmachkin, supra note 42, at 9.
47. GAO, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 3, at 17.
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The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) 41 conducts its own incident reporting sys-
tem. The IAEA and NEA systems are based on the following eight reporting
categories:
1. Exposure to radiation or release of radioactive material.
2. Degradation of items important to safety (structures, systems, components).
3. Deficiencies in design, construction, operation, and quality assurance.
4. Generic problems (recurring events which, taken together, have implications for
similar plants.
5. Significant consequential actions (actions taken by the regulatory body as a
result of reported events).
6. Events of potential significance to safety (those during which a protection sys-
tem operates unnecessarily, or fails to actuate when required).
7. Unusual events, of either man-made or natural origin, that directly or indirectly
threaten the ability of the plant to cooperate safely.
8. Events which, although they have no safety significance, attract significant
public interest.4 9
The two reporting systems address similar incidents, but differ substantially in
their membership and international acceptability.
Several countries, including the United States,50 had been reluctant to join the
IAEA-IRS, contending that the NEA's system provided an adequate information
base and that the two systems are duplicative. 5' The NEA membership, however,
does not include Eastern Bloc or developing countries, and the program is coor-
dinated with the IAEA-IRS to decrease duplication. 52 The United States' reluc-
tance to join the IAEA-IRS was, in part, due to a fear that the Soviet Union
would receive technical information about United States reactors without provid-
ing similar data on its own power plants.53 The Soviet Union, however, already
receives such information. 54 Furthermore, post-Chernobyl politics have eased the
transfer of information, making it likely that Soviet bloc countries will contribute
more to the reporting system. Testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on
Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Government Processes explains the need for
full participation in incident reporting systems:
The United States has . . . agreed to join and participate in the IAEA system ...
[11n view of the serious accident at Chernobyl, full participation by all nations that
48. The NEA, a specialized agency of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment, with 24 members, functions to improve the safety of nuclear power programs through increased
cooperation on safety and regulatory matters. Id. at 4.
49. Epel, Franzen & Osmachkin, supra note 42, at 9.
50. The United States, through the NEA and itsown bilateral agreements, shares information on
operating experience with the operators of about 80% of the nuclear power plants world-wide. The
remaining 20% are located mainly in Eastern Bloc countries. GAO, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE,
supra, note 3, at 25.
51. Id. at 26.
52. IAEA Press Release, supra note 44. The IAEA alone expects 150 reports annually.
53. GAO, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 3, at 26.
54. Id. at 40.
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have nuclear power programs would maximize the benefits of the incident reporting
arrangements. Sharing such information, if the United States can acquire more
information on Soviet reactors, is of special importance in view of the Soviet
construction of two large nuclear power reactors in Cuba.55
In addition to the reporting systems of the IAEA and the NEA, many countries
have promulgated bilateral agreements to require the exchange of general safety
information on nuclear power plants near international borders, and the immedi-
ate transmission of information on reactor abnormalities at these plants. The
Soviet Union has agreed, for instance, to provide the United States with technical
information regarding the safety of its two Cuban nuclear reactors.56 A more
formal example of these bilateral agreements is the 1984 agreement between
Austria and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, which provides for the ex-
change of specific information on nuclear power plants near the border, and
which requires the immediate exchange of information regarding significant
changes in reactor conditions.57
These bilateral agreements and the multilateral reporting systems of the IAEA
and the NEA provide stepping stones to the necessary level of international
cooperation; alone, however, they do not generate sufficient information. All
countries operating nuclear power plants are not involved in a reporting system,5 8
and reporting gaps exist even for those countries which actively participate in the
IAEA or NEA program.5 9
The IAEA Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, although
an important recognition of the problem, does not supplant the need to improve
incident reporting. The Convention covers "any accident . . . from which a
release of radioactive material occurs or is likely to occur and which has resulted
in or may result in an international transboundary release that could be of radi-
ological safety significance for another State." The Convention, by concerning
itself only with accidents that threaten or result in the release of radioactivity,
ignores many of the "incidents" 6 reported by the NEA and IAEA systems, and
therefore misses many opportunities to provide states with the safety related
55. International Response to Nuclear Power Reactor Safety Concerns: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Gov't Processes of the Senate Comm. on Govern-
mental Affairs, 99 Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986) at 5 (statement of Allan Mendelowitz, Assoc. Dir. Nat'l
Security and Int'l Affairs Div. of GAO) (discussing GAO, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 3).
56. IAEA Adopts Safety Conventions, supra, note 9, at 4.
57. 36 NUCLEAR LAW BULL. 39 (Dec., 1985).
58. V. Tolstykh reports that 15 of 26 IAEA Member States with operating nuclear power plants
participate directly in the IAEA-IRS, while seven others participate in the NEA system. Two other
Member States participate in IAEA-IRS meetings, although they have not yet officially joined the
program. Tolstykh, supra note 39, at 8.
59. "[IAEA-IRSJ co-operation with the NEA-IRS is based on reciprocity, which takes into
account the ratio of reactors operating in OECD countries to those in the rest of the world (about
3:1)." Id. at 9.
60. See supra text accompanying note 45.
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information necessary to improve accident response and reactor design. 6' Es-
pecially important is the reporting of events which may precede serious acci-
dents, but which may not, alone, threaten the imminent release of radiation, and
thus would not be subject to the Convention. This type of reporting might have
prevented the accident at TMI in 1979.62
The Convention also lacks objective criteria by which to determine when its
provisions become effective. Rather than specifying when countries must provide
information on power plant conditions, the Convention leaves such determina-
tions to governmental discretion. Because there is no international standard defin-
ing radiological significance and there is no guide as to what constitutes the
"imminent release" of radioactivity, the Convention is ineffective; it will allow
many significant events to go unreported and will maintain the present system of
inconsistent incident reporting.
An amendment to the Convention providing for the prompt notification of all
abnormal reactor incidents would enhance nuclear safety.63 The mechanism for
such reporting already exists through programs of the IAEA and the NEA, and
the definitional work has already been done by these agencies. 61 Rather than
relying on differing state interpretations of Convention terms such as "release
that could be of radiological safety significance," the working terms of IAEA and
NEA programs should be used.
Because of the obvious association with national defense and the technological
sophistication necessary for nuclear power capability, states are very protective of
their nuclear industries and may well be skeptical of approving such an amend-
ment. However, states, in the post-Chernobyl reform movement, appear willing
to forego some of their sovereignty in order to attain meaningful advances in
international nuclear safety. Cooperative efforts must be undertaken before the
political climate returns to its pre-Chernobyl status to achieve significant safety
improvements and to prevent another accident.
Full incident reporting is essential to progress in nuclear safety. Alone, how-
ever, even improved reporting systems are insufficient. Information gained
61. It is essential that information as to all nuclear incidents is processed. "Every accident or
abnormal event and nuclear situation must be screened. Where appropriate, it must be rigorously
investigated to assess its implications for existing system design, equipment design and quality,
operator training and simulators, computer models of the system, plant procedures, safety systems,
emergency measures, management, and regulatory requirements. Implementation of lessons learned
from operational experience improves not only plant safety, but equipment reliability and plant
availability as well." Tolstykh, supra note 39, at 8.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 39-44.
63. Article 14 sets forth the amendment procedure for the Convention. Any State Party may
propose an amendment. If a majority of the States Parties request a conference to consider the
amendment, one will be convened and, if adopted by a two-thirds majority of all States Parties, the
amendment will be laid down in a protocol open for signature. Thirty days after three States have
consented to be bound by the protocol, it shall enter into force.
64. See supra note 49.
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through incident analyses must be applied through mandatory, state-of-the-art
safety regulations.
B. Standardization
The standardization of safety regulations would significantly improve the
safety and efficiency of nuclear power plants world-wide. Standardization would
increase public acceptance of nuclear power programs; decrease the overall costs
of nuclear power; eliminate duplicative research and development while con-
centrating research on advanced safety and waste disposal techniques; facilitate
international trade in reactors and nuclear materials, and clarify potential liability
claims as to transboundary releases of radiation.65
Chernobyl generated an increased interest in the standardization of regula-
tion. 66 K. Becker of the International Organization for Standardization's Tech-
nical Committee 85 "Nuclear Energy," enunciated six technical, economic, and
political reasons for the standardization of nuclear safety regulations:
1. To simplify, accelerate and standardize the complex licensing process for
nuclear facilities ...
2. To guarantee the siting, construction, operation and decommissioning of
nuclear facilities on a uniformly high safety level according to the latest state of
science and technology.
3. To take into account excessive public concern about the risks of nuclear power
in some of the highly industrialized countries, and improve public acceptance by
establishing world-wide consensus of all relevant parties involved....
4. The need for facilitating nuclear technology transfer to developing countries,
65. See e.g., Stadie, Sharing Safety Experience, CURRENT NUCLEAR POWER SAFETY ISSUES,
supra note 5, at 433; see also Panel, Id. at 473.
It has been argued that the advantages of standardized safety regulations would be enhanced by the
standardization of power plants themselves, and several countries already have commenced such
programs. France's nuclear power program has a high degree of national standardization, and Italy is
beginning its own program of standardization. Carle, When France Departs From Standardization,
NUCLEAR ENGINEERING INT'L, Oct. 1984, at 31. Fornaciari, Italy to Break Ground for First Stan-
dardized Nuclear Plant, POWER, June 1985, at 55. The United States is studying the ramifications of
standardizing the nuclear power industry. Atomic Industrial Forum, STANDARDIZATION OF NUCLEAR
POWER PLANTS IN THE U.S., 1986.
However, the international standardization of nuclear power plants is a politically unrealistic, and,
perhaps, technologically undesirable goal. Countries will be unwilling to concede all control over
power plant design to an international organization. Furthermore, assuming a minimum level of
safety, it is preferable to maintain several plant designs to minimize the dangers of committing to an
inferior design and to increase the likelihood of technological improvements.
66. A group of 173 experts from 48 countries and five international organizations met in
November, 1986 in Vienna and concluded that the IAEA's NUSS documents could form the basis for
internationally accepted safety requirements. The group, however, only considered the documents in
the context of voluntary standards. Voluntary Safety Standards Preferred, NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
INT'L, Dec. 1986, at 3. See also NUCLEAR ENGINEERING INT'L, July 1986, at 5.
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5. The increasing demand for international standards in new areas involving
substantial across-the-border activities, such as waste management, reprocessing,
non-proliferation and safeguards.
6. The large number of nuclear facilities sited close to international
borders .... 67
The formalization of standards and their incorporation into international law is
achievable through the adoption of a convention accepting particular regulations,
empowering the IAEA to require the adoption of its NUSS recommendations, or
through the creation of an entirely new agency to operate on its own or in
conjunction with the IAEA.
Morris Rosen, Assistant Deputy Director General of the IAEA and Director of
the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Safety, considered the creation of an interna-
tional nuclear safety body, and compared it to the International Commission on
Radiological Protection (ICRP).68 The ICRP, however, performs for radiation
exposure limits what the IAEA's extant NUSS standards do for power plant
safety: they provide recommendations with no enforcement. Rosen writes of the
proposed agency: "The objective would be to eventually translate the developed
philosophy into a licensing approach, but, as is true of the ICRP, the new body
would not encroach upon the responsibility of the various national regulatory
bodies by attempting to formulate specific advice concerning regulations." 69
Rosen continues, discussing "specific, universally applicable, technical recom-
mendations" (emphasis added). This hypothetical international safety body does
not help; recommended safety and technical standards exist now in the form of
NUSS and other safety recommendations published by the IAEA. Furthermore,
it is precisely this fragmented approach to safety that international standardiza-
tion seeks to eliminate. Nuclear safety requires firm, enforceable standards.
Rosen suggests that an international safety body could be affiliated with the
IAEA and states that the Agency is willing to cooperate with such a venture.70
However, much duplication could be saved by mandating, through a convention,
the IAEA's NUSS standards. NUSS standards are based on international consen-
sus as to the best safety standards now used in member states. If NUSS docu-
ments are redrafted to represent the highest achievable level of safety and are
updated periodically, they would provide a good source for international safety
67. Becker, supra note 17, at 264-65.
68. Rosen, supra note 3, at 4.
The ICRP could provide an alternative basis for internationally mandated standards, but enforce-
ment would be necessary. The ICRP's present standards are a possible starting point for mandatory
standards. See Lindh, Grill & Palmgren, Co-ordination of International Safety Co-operation: The
Nordic Example, CURRENT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY ISsUES, supra note 5, at 429 for a
description of the Nordic Liaison Committee for Atomic Energy, an organization which provides
common safety standards for Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Iceland.
69. Rosen, supra note 3, at 4.
70. Id. at 5.
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regulations. The IAEA itself is beginning to consider this possibility.7' NUSS
standards could be set as the minimum required level of safety measures, thus
allowing for continued research and development by individual countries and by
the IAEA. Natural incentives for research and development, such as improved
safety and reduced implementation and liability costs, would not be affected by
base-level mandates. A combined international effort to improve nuclear safety,72
organized through the IAEA, would use resources efficiently by eliminating
duplicative research and development and by disseminating information through
pre-existing channels.
CONCLUSION
The spirit of increased cooperation of countries regarding nuclear safety re-
duces the political difficulties of amending the Convention on Early Notification
of a Nuclear Accident and of adopting mandatory safety standards. 73 Several
countries already have suggested a policy of mandatory standards, and many
others appear willing to consider a proposal for enforceable international safety
requirements. Countries concerned with reducing anti-nuclear resistance from
their citizenry 74 and with implementing significant improvements in safety now
seem ready to combine efforts to establish and follow stringent regulations.
Improving nuclear safety is an international priority. Chernobyl forced coun-
tries to reevaluate both internal safety programs and cooperative efforts with
neighboring countries and international organizations. International regulation of
the nuclear power industry should include a full reporting and information ex-
change system for incidents occuring at all nuclear power plants; such a system
can be created by amending the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear
Accident to incorporate the terms of the IAEA and NEA incident reporting
systems. The adoption of a convention setting internationally mandated base-
level safety requirements patterned after the presently unenforceable NUSS stan-
dards will also enhance nuclear safety.
71. Rosen, supra note 21, at 14. IAEA Steps up Safety Measures, NUCLEAR ENGINEERING INT'L,
July 1986, at 5. International Response to Chernobyl, 28:4 IAEA BULL. 42 (Winter, 1986).
72. For a brief discussion of the superiority of increasing international cooperation through interna-
tional organizations rather than through bilateral agreements see Stadie, supra note 65, at 433.
73. "Chernobyl has created both the right atmosphere and the political momentum for increased
international co-operation, and the member States have begun to grasp the opportunity."
Cruickshank, Safety-Less Politics More Co-operation, NUCLEAR ENGINEERING INT'L, Nov. 1986,
at 15. See, e.g., IAEA Press Release, PR/86/41, Nov. 3, 1986.
74. In the United States, for instance, although the public considers nuclear power necessary for
long-term energy supplies, support for the nuclear industry is decreasing. A February, 1984 Office of
Technology Assessment report, NUCLEAR POWER IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY, shows that the public
attitude is increasingly anti-nuclear. See GAO, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 3, at 1.
Furthermore, even before the April 1986 accident at Chernobyl, polls found 40-55% of the public in
many countries outside of the Eastern Bloc opposed to nuclear power programs. Cave, The Need for a
New Approach to Reactor Safety, in CURRENT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY ISSUES, supra note
17, at 433.
